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Kirkland: Adjudication of Guilt in a Criminal Case in Florida

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

ADJUDICATION OF GUILT IN A CRIMINAL CASE
IN FLORIDA
All jurisdictions within the United States agree that for a sentence
to be lawfully imposed the records of a criminal trial must show that
the court found the defendant guilty.' They differ, however, as to
how this finding of guilt may be shown. In the majority of jurisdictions the only requirement is that it be apparent from the complete
record of the trial.2
Florida has adopted the minority position. In this state it is clear
that to support a sentence, an express adjudication of the defendant's
guilt by the court is required. 3 A person is convicted when the jury
returns a verdict of guilty and the judge clinches the finding by
adjudicating him guilty, even though he may never be punished.4
Thus a verdict of guilty returned by the jury or a plea of guilty
entered by the defendant himself is not evidence of conviction of a
crime until it has been made effective by an adjudication of the court
adopting it.5 No particular form is required for this adjudication, but
it will not be implied from the mere fact that the court imposed
sentence.6
Whether a formal adjudication of guilt is necessary if the trial
judge suspends imposition of sentence and places the defendant on
probation apparently has not been directly answered on the appellate
level in Florida. Some circuit judges are of the opinion that an
adjudication is not required. 7 They point out that the loss of civil
rights provided by law upon conviction of certain crimes s may hamper
rehabilitation of the defendant to the status of a responsible member
of society. Since there cannot be a conviction without an adjudication
of guilt, they suspend adjudication, suspend imposition of sentence,
and place the defendant on probation. This procedure permits the
defendant to retain his civil rights while assuring adequate supervision over him. If the probationer violates the terms of his probation,
'See 15 AM. JUR., Criminal Law §445 (1938); Annot., 69 A.L.R. 792 (1930).
2See note 1 supra.

3Shargaa v. State, 102 So.2d 809 (Fla. 1958); Weathers v. State, infra note 4;
Ellis v. State, infra note 5.
4Weathers v. State, 56 So.2d 536 (Fla. 1952).
5Ellis v. State, 100 Fla. 27, 129 So. 106 (1930).
6lbid.
7See Letter, Judge John U. Bird, 32 FLA. B.J. 528 (1958).
SFLA. STAT. § §112.01, 97.041, 40.01 (1957).
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he may be brought before the court, adjudged guilty, and sentenced.
The ends to be obtained from this procedure seem to be desirable.
However, unless adjudication of guilt can be suspended indefinitely
along with imposition of sentence, it must be made; and once it is
rendered the defendant stands convicted and loses his civil rights regardless of the wishes of the trial judge. 9
ADJUDICATION UNDER THE FLORIDA STATUTES

Section 948.01 of Florida Statutes 1957, which authorizes a trial
judge to order probation, includes suspension of sentence in the procedure leading to probation. Since adjudication of guilt is necessary
before sentence can be imposed, it would seem that suspension of
sentence would equally require that the defendant be adjudged guilty.
Otherwise the trial court would have no authority to consider the
sentence in relation either to suspension or imposition.
Section 924.06 (1) grants a defendant who has been placed on probation the right of appeal from the "judgment of the court adjudging his guilt." It would seem, therefore, that a defendant who is
placed on probation but not adjudged guilty could not appeal. Considering these statutes together, it appears that the legislature intends
that every accused who is found guilty of the crime charged shall be
adjudged guilty by the court.
Section 921.02 of Florida Statutes 1957 makes an adjudication of
guilt mandatory if the defendant "has been convicted." This use of
the word convicted seems to imply that there can be a conviction upon
the rendering of a verdict or the entering of a plea of guilty, even
though there has been no express adjudication. However, as has been
indicated, it is clear that there must be an express adjudication of
guilt for there to be a conviction. 10
Even if this were not true and the use of convicted in section
921.02 is interpreted to mean that an express adjudication is not required, the necessary implication would be that a defendant would
stand convicted and lose his civil rights at the time a verdict of guilty
was rendered or a plea of guilty entered. Therefore, suspension of an
adjudication of guilt by the trial judge would be immaterial as to
the defendant's loss of civil rights.
OSee Letter, supra note 7.
l0Shargaa v. State, 102 So.2d 809 (Fla. 1958); Weathers v. State, 56 So.2d 536
(Fla. 1952); Ellis v. State, 100 Fla. 27, 129 So. 106 (1930).
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RECENT CASES

Two recent cases concerning the power of a trial court to suspend
imposition of sentence support the conclusion that an adjudication
of guilt is required for suspension of imposition of sentence. The
District Court of Appeal for the First District, in Bateh v. State,"
while discussing the history, at common law and under the Florida
decisions, of the power of a judge to suspend the imposition of sentence, seemed to assume that to exercise the power to suspend sentence a court must have before it a convicted criminal.
The Florida Supreme Court, in Helton v. State, in adopting the
reasoning of the Bateh case on this point, used the following language: 12

"Thus, regardless of whether the practice as it existed in this
state prior to 1941 was lawful, it is clear that since that date
the power to suspend the imposition of sentence upon a convicted criminal can be exercised by a trial judge only as an
incident to probation under the provisions of Ch. 948.
(Emphasis added.)
The 1957 Florida Legislature apparently reached this conclusion
when it enacted a statute placing a time limitation of five years on
the trial court's power to impose sentence upon a convicted criminal
whose sentence was suspended at the time of his conviction." Evidently the Legislature was of the opinion that a trial judge could
exercise his power to suspend the imposition of sentence only if the
defendant was convicted.
Shargaa v. State1 4 has been cited as supporting the practice of not
adjudging defendants guilty if they are to be placed on probation.
The defendant was seeking reversal of a judgment finding him guilty
of being a second offender under section 775.09 of Florida Statutes
1957, on the ground that he was not adjudged guilty of the first
offense and was therefore not convicted. For the first offense, com11101 So.2d 869 (lst D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
12106 So.2d 79, 80 (Fla. 1958).
13FLA. STAT. §775.14

(1957). The apparent reason for the enactment of this
statute was to limit the time within which a trial judge could sentence a defendant
who had been placed on probation from day to day or term to term. Helton v.
State has eliminated the necessity for this statute, and it should be repealed.
14102 So.2d 809 (Fla. 1958).
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mitted in 1942, the defendant had been placed on probation for one
year. In 1954 he was sentenced to serve three months in the county
jail for the second offense. Following his conviction for the second
offense, he was tried and adjudged guilty as a second offender and
sentenced to serve eight years in the state prison. To establish sufficient evidence of conviction of the first offense, the state produced
the original records of the trial, but they were found not to contain
an adjudication of the defendant's guilt. The state maintained that
the fact that the defendant was placed on probation was sufficient to
show a prior conviction. As an alternative argument the state presented the order of probation, properly signed by the judge, containing
a formal adjudication of the defendant's guilt.
On appeal the Supreme Court accepted the order of probation as
a part of the original record of the trial and upheld the defendant's
conviction as a second offender. However, the Court rejected the
argument that the mere fact that the defendant was placed on probation was sufficient to show a prior conviction. Concerning this contention, the Court said: "It is the responsibility of the prosecution
in a second offender proceeding to prove the prior conviction by
competent evidence. This includes a proper showing that the accused
was previously adjudged guilty of a felony by a Court of competent
jurisdiction."1 5
There was a statement in the advance sheets of this opinion to
the effect that a formal adjudication of a defendant's guilt is essential
to support a subsequent suspension of imposition of sentence accompanied by probation. However, this was deleted by the Court from
the official reports. The proponents of the practice of suspending adjudication of guilt feel that this deletion supports them in their contention. It is important to note, however, that the Supreme Court was
looking for "competent evidence" of the defendant's prior conviction,
instead of deciding whether it was proper not to have adjudged him
guilty. The Court has held in the past that an adjudication of guilt
will not, on direct attack, even be implied from the imposition of
sentence. 16 To have held that probation is evidence of this adjudication would certainly have been inconsistent. An assumption that the
Court, by holding that probation was not evidence of an adjudication
of guilt, impliedly sanctioned the practice of placing a defendant on
probation without adjudication seems unwarranted.
151d. at 812.
'GEllis v. State, 100 Fla. 27, 129 So. 106 (1930).
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Another important point in this case is that if the Supreme
Court had not found a proper adjudication of the defendant's guilt
for the first offense in the order of probation, it would apparently
have had no choice but to reverse his conviction as a second offender.
Thus it follows that if a defendant is found guilty by the jury of committing a felony and the judge intends to suspend imposition of
sentence and place him on probation but fails to adjudge him guilty,
17
he cannot be tried and convicted under the second-offender statute
upon conviction for a second offense. However, if he is adjudged
guilty for the first offense, he is subject to trial and conviction as a
second offender. The same analysis would apply to a charge under
the fourth-offender statute.' 8
THE NATURE OF PROBATION

The nature and character of probation as viewed by the Florida
Supreme Court and various other authorities should be considered.
The Florida Court in Cason v. State said: 19
"The power of the court to suspend the imposition of sentence
and the power to place on probation are part of the penalty
fixed by law for those convicted of crime because they modify
the language of the statutes fixing penalties which would otherwise be imposed.
"A period of probation in one case may be just as appropriate a penalty as the imposition of the maximum period of
imprisonment provided by law would be in another." (Emphasis added.)
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
in Cooper v. United States, 20 had this to say concerning probation:
"It is an authorized mode of mild and ambulatory punishment, the
probation being intended as a reforming discipline. The probationer
is not a free man, but is subject to surveillance, and to such restrictions as the Court may impose."
Thus it is apparent that even though sentence is suspended, pro§775.09 (1957).
18d §775.10.
19159 Fla. 294, 295, 31 So.2d 274, 275 (1947).
2091 F.2d 195, 199 (5th Cir. 1937).
17FLA. STAT.
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